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IN DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL
EDWIN H. GREENEBAUMt

Our jurisprudence is being infected by a disease which might go
by the term "galloping res judicata." One prominent symptom of this
disease is the seemingly ever-increasing abandoment of the requirement of
mutuality of estoppel. One wonders at the spectacle of judges in some
recent cases punishing losers for the benefit of persons who have risked
nothing, but would like to be vicarious winners.
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel provides, generally, that a
judgment in a prior litigation will preclude litigation of matter in a subsequent action only where both parties to that subsequent action are
bound by the prior judgment.'
The mutuality of estoppel doctrine has had, few unqualified and
unashamed defenders, 2 Which is unfortunate since the requirement is
sensible and based on significant considerations of fairness.
The argument which follows will explain the considerations which
support the mutuality requirement and explore those categories of cases
wherein the law has always found exceptions to the mutuality requirement to be necessary. It will be developed, further, that the supposed trend
away from mutuality' is probably more apparent than real,4 that the
largest portion of cases which have purported to reject the doctrine in
fact required no departure at all from traditional precedent and, more
critically, that the arguments usually made in rejecting mutuality are
superficial and unconvincing.
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1. See
929 (1925).

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS §

93 (1942); 1 A.

FREEMAN, JUDGEMENTS

2. They include lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 6.412 [1] (1965); Moore
and Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. Rlv. 301 (1961);
Seavey, Res udicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor Privies-Two
California Cases, 57 HARv. L. REv. 98 (1943); Von Moschzisker, Res Jiudicata, 38
YALE L.J. 299 (1929).

3. "[T]he 'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter." B. R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall,
19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1967).
4. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text infra.
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THE BASIS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT

The fallibility of the litigation process is the most fundamental basis
for the mutuality requirement as well as for all other limitations upon the
preclusive effects of judgments; no one should ever undertake to guarantee
the accuracy of the results of litigation. For some purposes (to meet due
process requirements, for example) the law asks a yes or no question as
to whether a party has had an adequate day in court. Days in court,
however, in fact vary greatly in quality. Litigation may miscarry in
many ways without producing errors sufficient to warrant a new trial.
A losing party is generally responsible for his own mistakes and the
mistakes of his own counsel, and even mistakes by the court, a jury or
the other party will not produce relitigation of the issues if the errors are
considered "harmless" when weighed against the desirability of terminating the dispute between the parties and avoiding the harassment and
expense of relitigation as between the parties.' But such questions might
be answered differently vis-i-vis a person who has been put to no
expense and who has no strong interest in being able to rely on his
dispute as having been resolved.'
An additional consideration supporting the mutuality requirement
is the problem of rationing litigation resources. A party facing potential
5. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 61:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or anything done or omitted by the court or

by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not effect the
substantial rights of the parties.
Even between the parties there was something of a sportsmanship principle of an
adequate chance at common law, as evidenced, for example, by the broad right of
voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
6. See Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, , 445 P.2d 557, 562 (1968):
It is the adversary system that we have espoused in our system of justice.
The adversary system prevails in many aspects of the life of man but contest

rules seldom provide that one contestant must be declared the loser to a competitor that he has never met on the field of contest....
While this court believes that our system of justice has no peer in this
fallible world, nevertheless, it is unable to consider that our trial processes
unerringly discover Truth. The selection of the judge and jury, the choice of
counsel, the availability of witnesses, the manner of the presentation of their
testimony, the dynamics of the rapport between witnesses and fact-finder, and
the personalities and appearances of the parties as they impress the factfinder in various ways, are all matters that defy scientific analysis, are
affected by fortuitous circumstances and variously determine the outcome of
a contest conducted in the courts of this country.
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multiple litigation with diverse parties' would like to invest resources in
each litigation in light of what is at stake in the case,8 but-absent the
requirement of mutuality of estoppel-he may have great difficulty knowing what he stands to win or lose. He may or may not be aware of the
potential litigation with other persons, and even if he is, more will be at
stake if he loses his case than will be if he wins, because non-parties cannot
be adversely affected by litigation results when they have not had their
day in court. This factor also reflects on the likelihood of accuracy in the
litigation process; if a common party must ration limited resources for the
possibility of multiple litigation, his ability to achieve the favorable and,
from his viewpoint, correct result in each case will be diminished.
An additional dilemma which sometimes faces a party and which is
seriously aggravated if the mutuality rule is not adhered to is choosing
whether to acquiesce, without seeking a new trial or appeal, in a judgment
based on unfavorable findings of liability but with a favorable amount of
damages. For example, in Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific
Airlines9 defendant had suffered an adverse judgment in a prior action
regarding its liability for a plaintiff's injuries arising from an airplane
crash, but the amount of the verdict was only a fraction of what the
plaintiff had demanded and might eventually have recovered had the
case been retried. In a later action by other passengers on the defendant's
airplane for injuries arising from the same accident, the court held that
the defendant should be permitted to acquiesce in the prior judgment
without moving for a new trial or taking an appeal without submitting
itself to liability to other potential claimants by application of issue
preclusion.
The mutuality requirement should also be considered in light of the
relation of litigation to other devices for resolving disputes. Litigation
is often used by parties to disputes as a strategic tool to help obtain
favorable settlements which we naively insist on treating as voluntary. At
best, a party facing multiple litigation faces special pressures in settlement
negotiations because of the resource problems referred to above; to the
extent that mutuality of estoppel is not required, however, his strategic
7. This article will refer to a litigant who is a party to multiple litigation and
against whom a prior judgment is being asserted by a person who was not a party to
the prior proceeding as the "common party."
8. Compare the justification by the Advisory Committee of the proposed discovery
rule for the federal courts which would permit discovery of limitations of liability
insurance: "Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make
the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that, the settlement and litigation strategy
are based on knowledge and not speculation." PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURTS,

Rule 26(d) (2) (1967), Advisory Committee's Note.

9. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
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problems are seriously aggravated. Even where a party in good
faith believes in the merits of his cause, he must calculate the chances that
he may lose his case either because the questions are close or because there
exist legally irrelevant but practically important sympathetic factors favoring his opponent.' Absent mutuality, a common party may be under
special pressures to settle unfavorably a first litigation to avoid the chance
that his case may control subsequent actions; and of course, absent
mutuality, the common party who has already lost a prior case is faced
with subsequent settlement negotiations with the balance of power very
drastically shifted.
There have always been exceptions to the requirement of mutuality
of estoppel." The most consistently recognized exception arises when,
because a relation exists between non-common parties, the non-common
party to a prior judgment cannot have full benefit of that judgment without holding the common party bound to it in subsequent litigation with the
second non-common but related party.12 The significant relation is most
frequently a surety relation.' Suppose, for example, that in an automobile
collision case a plaintiff brings an action against a servant who was driving

his master's vehicle, asserting that the servant because of his negligence is
responsible for the injury. Suppose further that the defendant wins a
judgment in his favor based upon an adjudication of the merits of the case.
A subsequent suit against the master on the doctrine of respondeat
superior will be barred by the prior judgment. 4 The most persuasive
reason for this result is that if the master suffers injury because of his
servant's breach of duty, the master will have a cause of action for
indemnification against his servant or, alternatively, may be subrogated to
the rights of the third party.15 Thus, unless the second suit against the
10. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725
(1969) discussed at notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
11. See Ferrers v. Arden, 78 Eng. Rep. 906 (C.P. 1701).
12. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96-109 (1942).
13. A surety relation is one where each of two parties is immediately liable to a
third party for a debt, but as between the two debtors one of them is ultimately liable.
The party ultimately liable is referred to as the principal debtor, the other as the
surety. See L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHiP 6-9 (1950).

14.

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

§ 96 (1942). It is often stated or assumed that

exceptions to the mutuality doctrine involve only application of collateral estoppel, or
issue preclusion, but this is in error. In appropriate cases there may be merger, or claim
preclusion, as well. Suppose that a claimant potentially has alternative theories of
liability which he may assert against both master and servant: for example, negligence
and strict liability. If he asserts only one theory against the servant and suffers an
adverse judgment on the merits, he should undoubtedly be precluded from pursuing
the master on the other theory, even though the rules of collateral estoppel would not
apply. See Vestal, Extent of Claim Prechsion,54 IOWA L. REv. 1, 4-12 (1968).
15. This is a general feature of surety relations. See L. SIMPsoN, supra note 13
at 205-37.
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master is barred, the servant may be required to defend himself against
liability a second time in spite of his prior victory, and the master may be
faced with inconsistent judgments if the servant's second defense is again
successful. The law has always accepted the need to avoid this dilemma as
more important than the considerations supporting the requirement of
mutuality. 16
Bernhard v. Bank of America" is often thought to be a leading
precedent for further exceptions to the mutuality doctrine.1 8 In fact, the
Bernhard case falls within the exception described above; only the fact
situation in Bernhard.wasnovel.
Helen Bernhard, a beneficiary of a decedent's estate, had challenged
the accounting of the executor on the ground that the executor had
improperly withdrawn for his own use funds from an account of the
decedent with the Bank of America. The executor's defense to this charge
was that the decedent, during her lifetime, had made a gift of the account
to him. The issue was adjudicated favorably to the executor, and his
accounts were approved. Subsequently, Bernhard obtained for herself an
appointment as administratrix for the estate. In this capacity she sued the
Bank of America on the same account which had been in dispute in the
prior action. The Bank of America successfully pleaded the prior judgment as a bar to the later action. It seems clear that had the former
adjudication defense not been allowed in Bernhard, and had the bank been
held liable on the account, the bank would have had a cause of action
against the former executor for indemnification, as subrogated to the
rights of the estate, for unjust enrichment or on a kindred theory. 9
Prohibition of this second, indirect attack on the executor would have
been required by precedent.2"
The exception to the mutuality requirement under examination,
which might for this purpose be referred to as the "related non-common
parties exception," may be broader than a surety or indemnity exception
and may justifiably include other cases in which there is some relationship
between the non-common parties which might require the cleaning up
between them of leftover claims involving the same subject matter or in
16. See Ferrers v. Arden, 78 Eng. Rep. 906 (C.P. 1701) ; A. FREEMAN, supra note
1 at 932-36.
17. 19 Cal..2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
18. "[It is recognized that the widest breach in the citadel of mutuality was
rammed by Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of America ...

"

Zdanok v.

The Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 1964).
19. See note 15 supra; see RESTATEMENT OF REsTiTuTIoN §§ 15, 23, 163 (1937);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-407.
20. Professor Seavey had a different way of reconciling Bernhard to prior precedent. Seavey, Res Judicata With Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor PrkdesTwo California Cases,57 HARv. L. REv. 98, 101 (1943).
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which one of the non-common parties might be unduly harassed by
multiple litigation even though a party to only one of them.
From a prospective viewpoint it will sometimes be difficult to tell
which of the related non-common parties is likely to be the principal
debtor and which the surety. For example, when the conduct of a servant
for which a master is held to be responsible is unauthorized, the servant
may be required to indemnify his master, as was suggested in the
respondeat superior situation discussed above. 2 In contrast, however, if
the servant is found responsible to a third party for acts which have been
authorized by his employer, the employer may be required to indemnify
his employee. 2 Clearly, it would be undesirable to litigate in suits with
the common party relations between the non-common parties with only
one of them present, because the absent party would not be bound by such
a judgment.
Furthermore, separate suits against related non-common parties
may be unduly harassing even though each is involved as a party in only
one suit. An employee will probably be involved in the suit against his
master at least as a witness and will perhaps be otherwise obligated to
cooperate in the defense." Or, where the motor vehicle owned by the
master has been damaged in a collision when the servant was driving, the
servant may similarly be involved in the master's litigation attempting to
recover property damage from the common party. The desirability of
avoiding such harassment suggests giving the benefits of the prior
judgment to the prior non-party even if his involvement was not of the
kind or extent which would make him a privy to that judgment.
As this related non-common party exception moves to its outer limits,
the balance of considerations for and against the mutuality requirement
in the context of each case becomes less clear; as a result precedent has
gone both ways.' 4 Most commonly, alleged tortfeasors have been given the
benefit of prior judgments for persons sought to be held vicariously
liable based upon issues which exonerate the actors; but even in this the
21. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 (1959) ; W. SEAvEY, AGENCY 265-

69 (1964).
23. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
SEAVEY, AGENCY 256, 268-69 (1964).

OF AGENCY

§ 399, Comment h (1959); W.

24. Compare Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950) (plaintiff
libellant's suit for personal injuries against United States, owner of vessel, barred where
plaintiff had lost earlier suit against steamship company, general agent of United
States) with Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968) (liability in administratrix's suit against driver whose auto had collided with auto driven by deceased not
established by judgment adverse to defendant in property damage suit by deceased's
employer-owner of auto).
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authorities are not unanimous.25
A balancing, case-by-case approach in this fringe area could be
undertaken. This approach would give rise to such questions as: what
control did the various parties have over the scope of the action by way of
joinder of parties, by use of counterclaims and declaratory judgments;
what control did the parties have over the time and place of litigation"
and what is the impact in the immediate case of the various factors which
have been identified as supporting the mutuality requirement in general?
One should be warned, however, that case-by-case balancing without
giving general rules regarding when the mutuality requirement will be
departed from raises serious problems for the predictability and reliability
7

of judgments.1

The other exception to the requirement of mutuality which has been
recognized with some frequency is that a convicted criminal defendant
may be bound by findings necessary to the determination of his guilt in
subsequent civil litigation with private parties. 8 This exception may be
justified by the high burden of persuasion required in criminal litigation,
the more acute embarrassment of inconsistent results in this area or
some public policy reason.
Until recent years, most cases recognizing exceptions to the requirement of mutuality fell into one or another of these traditional
categories.
Recent amendments to the class action provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure29 have attempted to abrogate what may be
identified as having been an additional exception to the mutuality requirement. In this regard certain precedents in the federal courts which
antedated the amendments by only a short time and which represented
novel departures from the mutuality requirement will, if adhered to, be in
derogation of the class action reform. In particular, the prior rule, as
applied, permitted a "spurious" class action in which the interests of the
class members were not related in such a way that a judgment adverse
to the class could be binding on class members who had not appeared in the
25. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(2), Illustration 9 (1942). Cf. Mackris
v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Kaylor v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 152 S.E.2d

418 (1967).
26. The leading article in this regard is Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
Professor Currie
subsequently modified his position somewhat in Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest
Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25 (1965).
27. See also note 62 and accompanying text infra.
28. E.g., Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d
439 (1962); Eagle, Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82,
140 S.E. 314 (1927).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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action.3" Some precedents, however, had permitted members of such a
class to intervene in the action after a determination of liability favorable
to the class had been made in order to allow the class members to obtain
their individual relief. 3 The possibility of this "one-way intervention"
made it very difficult for a party opposing a "spurious" class to know what
was at stake in the action and similarly made it very difficult to settle such
a case. The 1963 reform adopted by the Supreme Court was that in actions
which could be conducted usefully as class actions, but in which res
judicata effects could be applied under the prior rule only to those persons
appearing in the action, members of the class are to be given notice of the
pending action and are then to be bound by the judgment entered unless
they notify the court by a date given in the notice that they prefer not to
participate in the pending case. Thus, one-way intervention is eliminated
and mutuality of estoppel reinstated.
Two leading cases which if adhered to will be in derogation of this
reform are Zdanok v. The Glidden Co. 2 and United States v. United
Airlines.8 In Zdanok, employees of The Glidden Company were pursuing
their individual claims against their employer arising from an alleged
breach of their collective bargaining agreement. In this class action on
behalf of approximately 160 employees, the employer was held bound by
a previous decision in which five different employees had pursued their
claims arising from the same events. In the later action the employer
sought to introduce more extensive evidence bearing on the contractual
relation than had been introduced in the prior hearing, but the court held
the contractual obligation conclusively determined by the prior decision.
In United Airlines, an action involving numerous claims arising from a
mid-air collision of a commercial passenger plane and a military aircraft,
the defendant airline was held bound by an adverse determination regarding its liability for injuries arising from the collision in a prior action in
which it had been sued by numerous other claimants. These precedents
seem to sanction a new kind of one-way intervention; if they are followed,
it is difficult to see why potential members of a class would ever include
themselves in a class action.
30. Id., Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 Amendments; 3A J.
frl 23.11[3], 23.12 (1960) ; 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZKOF,
PRACTICE §§ 568, 572 (1961).
FEDERAL PRACTICE

MOORE,
FEDERAL

31. Id.; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: j966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 385-86 (1967).

32. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
33. 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962). See also, Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v.
Capital Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967).
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EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AGAINST
I "THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT

The stated assumptions and principles upon which the cases departing, or purporting to depart, from the mutuality requirement are based
seem to be on the whole superficial and unsupported. Justice Traynor in
the Bernhard case dismissed mutuality in a single sentence: "No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality."" The considerations discussed in the first part of this article sup-

porting the requirement were not identified, much less evaluated, in the
opinion. The cases which-have followed have done little better, often being
satisfied to cite Bernhard and other cases which fall predominately within
the traditional exceptions to the mutuality requirement."5
The mutuality requirement, according to cases in the developing
Bernhard tradition, must be abrogated because it is in derogation of the
34. 19 Cal. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
35. See cases cited note 69 infra.
To establish that there has been long standing dissatisfaction with the mutuality
requirement, Bernhard and several other cases have cited Jeremy Bentham's great work
on judicial evidence; J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence in 6 & 7 WoRx:s
oF JraE Y BENTHAM (Bowring ed. 1843). This reliance on Bentham is particularly
inappropriate. Bentham's treatise is a.discourse on evidence and his basic position is
that all evidence should be admitted unless its admission would itself cause undue
hardship by way of .expense, delay, vexation, or other collateral prejudice. "Evidence
is the basis of justice: exclude evidence, and you exclude justice." Id. 7 at 384. Bentham
deplored exclusionary rules, including an established rule preventing the use of previous judgments as evidence, absent mutuality. (See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §
93, Comment b (1942).)
Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger,
the contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule itself is a
curious one, the reason given for it is still more so: 'Nobody can take
benefit by a verdict, who had not been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary;' a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the
gaming table to the bench.
J. BENTHAM, supra 77 at 171. But reasoning which moves from a proposition that a prior
judgment should be usable as evidence, a form of "adscititious" evidence in Bentham's
vocabulary, to a rule that the prior judgment should be grounds to exclude evidence is
a mode of thought which Bentham also ridiculed.
One remarkable circumstance is, that the whole body of the rules of law
relating to the subject are, with a very small number of exceptions, exclusionary. Even a decision given in a former cause is said not to be evidence;
and then it is that decision which is excluded: or it is said to be conclusive
evidence; and then an exclusion is put upon the whole mass of evidence,
howsoever constituted, which might have been capable of being presented
on the other side.
In saying this, enough has already been said to satisfy anyone, who has
assented to what was said in a former chapter concerning adscititious evidence,
that nearly the whole of the established rules on this subject, except to the extent
of the single and very limited case in which it was there seen that the exclusion is proper, are bad. Accordingly, the rule that a judgment directly upon the
point is conclusive in any future cause between the same parties, is a good
rule-it is almost the Znly one that is.
Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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ideal of a "prompt and nonreptitious judicial system."3' Justice can be
accomplished, it is asserted, by res judicata doctrine, which states only two
requirements for preclusion: "There must be an identity of issue which
has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the
present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling."37 The following
paragraphs will attempt to analyze and criticize this argument.
The evil perceived by courts which have rejected the mutuality
requirement is multiple litigation, lasting over extended periods of time,
running up unnecessary expense, congesting court dockets and possibly
resulting in inconsistent judgments. But from whose viewpoint is there
multiple litigation? Certainly, the party asserting the estoppel in these
cases is not so harassed. He has not been previously a party, has been put
to no prior expense and has not hazarded anything in a former litigation.
Statutes of limitations exist to give him the protection provided by the
law against suits commenced too late. Neither is the party asserting the
estoppel potentially subject to inconsistent judgments; or if he is, the
case will fall into the uncontroversial exceptions to the mutuality requirement.3 8 The only possible answer is that preclusion is established in
these cases not to protect a party to the litigation, but to protect the
supposed interests of the courts and the public. 9 While many dicta can be
found stating that res judicata exists for public interests, in actual
practice precluding litigation for the benefit of a party who has no
personal claim for protection is novel, indeed, revolutionary.
Is it fair to assume, as many cases seem to, that the mutuality requirement results in an increased burden on the court system? No one
has ever really evaluated the extent to which the potential multiple
litigaton actually takes place,4" as opposed to being weeded out by the
settlement and statute of limitation processes, or whether permitting
multiple litigation is actually more costly. It may be that a party facing
multiple litigation without the protection of the mutuality requirement
may litigate his first action more fully than he otherwise would, thus
increasing expense. The result might even be an unwanted appeal or a new
36. Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65,

(1969).
37. Id. at -,

-

, 246 N.E.2d 725, 727

246 N.E.2d at 729.

38. See notes 11-28 and accompanying text supra.
39. This is the only answer, that is, unless one believes that a class of litigants,
e.g., plaintiffs in personal injury actions, should be able to win as easily as possible.
This position has not been advanced by the courts and is not sought to be refuted here.
But see note 50 and accompanying text infra.
40. See Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d, -,
246 N.E.2d 725, 734
(1969) (dissenting opinion). B.R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y. 2d 141, 149, 225 N.E.2d
195, 200 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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trial, in fact contributing to docket crowding." Court congestion and
expense to the public are statistical matters. The field of vision is distorted
if only isolated cases of actual multiple litigation are examined. It is only
in such cases, of course, that the mutuality question is raised. It also
seems not to be appreciated that prior trials will have some effect
on subsequent settlements and litigation even without total preclusion, in
that parties will have had experience regarding the persuasiveness of their
cause in court. If prior judgments were freely usable as evidence, the
inhibiting effect would be even greater." Even assuming increased
expense to the public, the decisions have not undertaken to balance that
cost against the factors supporting the mutuality requirement.43
One reason that multiple litigation may be viewed as an over-estimated evil is that there is very little motivation for it. It is an added
expense to the parties as well as to the courts, and contemporary procedural devices give a party an opportunity to control the relevant scope of
litigation no matter what his procedural posture by use of joinder,
counter-claims, demands for declaratory relief, intervention, objections to
the absence of necessary parties and discovery.44 Judges can seek to
protect the courts' and public's interests by giving advice and enlightening the parties regarding their self-interest; and in an era of pre-trial
conferences, a somewhat more aggressive attitude in such matters would
seem acceptable. Only three factors might inhibit a potential common
party from joining all his potential opponents in one suit: jurisdiction or
joinder limitations, lack of foreseeability or knowledge of litigation with
non-parties, or perceived strategic advantage. Jurisdiction and joinder
limitations are not the fault of the party, and he should not be punished
for something over which he has no control. 5 Lack of foreseeability or
41. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965). There is pressing current concern with crowded appellate court dockets.
See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HAv. L. REv. 542 (1969).

42. See J. BENTHAA, note 35 supra.
43. But the doctrine of judicial finality is not a catch-penny contrivance to
dispose of cases merely for the sake of disposition and clear up dockets in
that manner. The cost of maintaining all of our judicial establishments,
federal and state, is an extremely small item in maintaining our governments;
and this country can afford to provide the necessary courts and judges to
dispose of legitimate litigation in an orderly and proper manner. Indeed, it
cannot afford to do otherwise. Hence a case on behalf of the public interest
is not made out merely by asserting that abandonment of the doctrine of

mutuality will decrease litigation. The real issue is whether that method of
minimization is a proper one.
1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1810 (1965).
44. Discovery is included in this list because of the need to become informed if the
other devices are to be effectively used.
45. Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place some restrictions on the
joinder of parties. Rule 20 permits the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants when their
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knowledge of potential multiple litigation is less likely in an era of
discovery and with an experienced judge willing to give advice. In any
case, it does not seem fair, in accordance with accepted policy considerations,4" to bind a party to collateral effects of litigation if he cannot
reasonably foresee what is at stake. And finally, if the party believes he
will have a better chance in the absence of the additional party or in a
less complex litigation, and if the trial judge is unable to dissuade him of
this, then it seems somewhat strong-armed for the law to say definitively
that something else is a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate.
Another factor which has motivated some courts to reject the
mutuality requirement is the possibility of inconsistent results, "which
are always a blemish on a judicial system ....

[I]t is difficult to tolerate

a condition where, on relatively the same set of facts, one fact-finder, be it
a court or jury, may hold the driver liable, while the other exonerates
him."'-'
While inconsistent results may be a "blemish," it is very doubtful
that the few cases where the mutuality rule permits multiple litigation,
where multiple litigation in fact occurs and where inconsistent judgments
are actually rendered as a result are sufficient to increase substantially
this particular embarrassment. After all, if the common party had been
fortunate enough to prevail on the critical issue in the prior judgment,
the law permits him to be subjected to inconsistent results.
Even those most enthusiastic about abrogating the mutuality requirement have admitted that inconsistent results ought to be tolerated in
"anomalous" cases.4 The "multiple-claimant anomaly" has been stated
most lucidly by Professor Brainerd Currie." He posed a case in which
fifty passengers have been injured in a railroad derailment:
claims or defenses arise out of "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common [to them] will arise in
the action." There have been cases which have construed this rule narrowly in circumstances where the mutuality doctrine might have potential application. See, e.g., Sun-X
Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v. Sun-X International, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 365
(W.D. Wis. 1964).
It has been suggested that the mutuality doctrine should be manipulated and
applied in accordance with whether its application in particular circumstances would
encourage the joinder of parties. See Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality aM
Joinder of Parties,68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457, 1471 (1968). How complicated the application of such a principle and how unpredictable the results of its application in particular
cases would be, it is submitted, is suggested by Professor Semmel's own analysis. Id.
at 1475-79.
46. See The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944).
47. Schwartz v. Public Administration 24 N.Y.2d 65, , 246 N.E2d 725, 73031 (1969).
48. See, e.g., Zdanok v. The Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964).
49. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
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Suppose, that twenty-five passengers, in twenty-five separate actions, all fail to establish negligence on the part of the
railroad. Then passenger No. 26 wins his action. Are we to
understand that the remaining twenty-four passengers can plead
the judgment in the case of No. 26 as conclusively establishing
that the railroad was guilty of negligence, while the railroad
can make no reference to the first twenty-five cases which it
won?
There is only one possible answer to this question: no such
absurdity would be tolerated for a moment .... o
If we are unwilling to treat the judgment against the
railroad as res judicata when it is the last of a series, all of
which except the last were favorable to the railroad, it must
follow that we should also be unwilling to treat an adverse
judgment as res judicata even though it was rendered in the
first action brought, and is the only one of record. Our aversion
to the twenty-sixth judgment as a conclusive adjudication stems
largely from the feeling that such judgment in such a series
must be an aberration, but we have no warrant for assuming
that the aberrational judgment will not come as the first in the
series .... Over and over again it has been demonstrated that,
in the use of [the doctrine of collateral estoppel], courts must
be alert to the danger that its extension by merely logical processes of manipulation may produce results which are abhorrent to the sense of justice and to orderly law administration. 5
Actually, there is no need to rely on the possibility that the favorable
judgment is aberrational; the case is just as strong if it is assumed
possible that about half the cases will go each way. But is it really more
"anomalous" for a common party to be bound by a single unfavorable result where there may be fifty potential opponents than it is for him to be
bound to an unfavorable result where there are only two? The most
50. Professor Currie noted that one commentator has actually advocated the
"absurd" result. Comment, Prizity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata,

35 YALE L.J. 607 (1926). The commentator's argument, Currie notes, rests on the
proposition that "there is a considerable public advantage in the reduction of litigation."
Id. at 612. "Why, so there is," agrees Currie "and no doubt it would be to the public
advantage if there were no litigation at all; but the question is, at what point does the
public interest in reducing litigation yield to the interest in fair procedure?" Currie,
note 49 supra at 302. Compare 7 J. BENTHAm, note 34 supra at 172:
One is tempted, however, to ask, whether justice is a thing worth having,
or no? and if it be, at what time it is desirable that litigation should be at
an end? after justice is done, or before.
51. Currie, supra note 49 at 285-89.
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basic support for the mutuality requirement is, after all, the possibility of
inconsistent results in multiple litigation plus the inability to say with
confidence that the first is more likely correct; that is, the fallibility of the
litigation process. Inconsistent results may be embarrassing to a degree,
but it is much more disastrous to pretend to an infallibility which does not
exist and to sacrifice justice, as perceived by its victims, to a compulsion
for tidiness.
It is asserted, however, that the public owes a litigant only a single
"full and fair opportunity" to litigate an issue, and that the proposed test
will apply preclusion only where the common party has had such a day in
court. There are four areas of difficulty with this branch of the argument:
there is considerable ambiguity in what is meant by "full and fair opportunity;" there is considerable doubt whether in actual practice the
courts are giving this ideal more than lip service; if taken seriously, the
question of full and fair opportunity would itself be a difficult and
expensive issue to try fully and fairly; and, finally, introducing this vague
standard for litigation preclusion considerably lessens the predictability of
res judicata results in this area.
The quoted passage52 spoke of two tests for res judicata generally,
one of them being the full opportunity. Speaking of this requirement as
one generally applicable to res judicata cases suggests that no more is
intended than the minimum due process standards applicable in any case
where a party relies on a prior judgment. It has been suggested already
that the balance of values is very different as between a party who has
ventured nothing and a party who has reliance and repose interests in
a judgment, because he has made an investment and was put in jeopardy
in obtaining it.5"
While more than minimal due process is probably intended,54 courts
which have departed from the mutuality requirement appear to give this
standard only superficial attention. For example, some cases have suggested that where a relatively small amount is at stake in a prior proceeding,
a common party may not exert his best efforts, but in Zdanok v. The
Glidden Co.55 defendant was held to a judgment adjudicating five
claims (presumably of approximately equal amounts) in a subsequent
52. See note 37 and accompanying text sipra.
53. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
54. A comprehensive list of the various factors which enter into a determination whether a party has had his day in court would include such considerations as the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use
of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the confidence and experience of
counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future litigation.
Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, , 246 N.E.2d 725, 729 (1969).
55. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). See also note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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proceeding involving 160; the court dismissed the argument of unfairness, saying that it was inapplicable because the common party was
fully aware at the time of the prior trial that the larger number of claims
were pending in another suit, which is at least partially beside the point in
that the problem of allocating litigation resources is as acute whether the
larger claim is foreseeable or not."8 It is unfair to require a party to litigate
as though 165 claims are at stake when he has the opportunity to win
with respect to only five.
Schwartz v. Public Administrator5 is a more extreme example.
This was an appeal in three cases, each of which gave rise to the same
question:
Should a judgment in favor of a passenger in an action
against the operators of two colliding vehicles give rise to an
estoppel, which would bar a subsequent action by one of the
drivers against the other for his own personal injuries or
property damage ?
The court held that if the prerequisites for collateral estoppel were otherwise present, lack of mutuality of estoppel would not prevent preclusion
unless the common party was able to show affirmatively (that is, with
the burden of persuasion on the party resisting preclusion)"o that he had
not previously had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue.
The common parties in these cases attempted to make that demonstration
by reference to two factors. First, there is special sympathy for plaintiffs
in personal injury actions, where the juries surely realize that defendants
are insured. Secondly, the representation which the common parties had
in the prior action was provided by attorneys selected by their insurer and
may have been inadequate because of conflicts of interest. For example, in
a given case an insurer may be more interested in seeing that co-defendants also suffer adverse judgments than in exonerating the insured. In
any case their former attorneys were not ones of the common parties'
choice. The court held these factors inadequate to show lack of a full
opportunity on the strength of the argument that the common parties
could have neutralized the prejudice and been represented by an attorney
of their own choice if they had filed counter-claims for their own injuries
in the prior actions (theoretically permissive counter-claims). One of the
plaintiffs argued that he had refrained from filing a counter-claim in the
56. Compare Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958).
57. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969). See also, Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn.
515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964).
58. 24 N.Y.2d. at - , 246 N.E.2d at 727.
59. Id. at , 246 N.E.2d at 730; B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 148,
225 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1967).
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prior action in reliance on precedents which were presently being overruled, believing that he would have a better chance in a separate litigation.
This reliance interest was held not reasonable or worthy of protection
because of the unsettled nature of the law on mutuality of estoppel.
Another plaintiff argued that he was not permitted to file a counter-claim
in the prior action because he was subject to compulsory arbitration under
the uninsured motorist provision of his insurance policy. This was held
to make no difference, however, because the plaintiff had "offered nothing
which would indicate that he was actually prejudiced by his inability to
join his claim to the prior action."6 How he could have done this without examining the jurors, or even psychoanalyzing them, in regard to the
process of their reaching a decision, the court does not say. Further, the
court does not account for the fact that in actions where there are several
attorneys, each with rights to examine and cross-examine the witnesses,
the attention which the jury will give to the arguments of each party is
diminished.
A vigorous dissenting opinion argued that a passenger who is
injured in a collision is "in a preferred litigation position" when he
asserts "his claim against the [insurers] of both owners and of both
drivers ;" because of the natural sympathies for a plaintiff and the potential
efforts of each defendant to exonerate himself at the expense of the
other, a plaintiff's verdict was almost inevitable "barring some odd miscarriage."" One need not be as certain about the inevitability of plaintiff's
recoveries in personal injury litigation, as is this dissenter, to concede the
prejudicial factors which he identifies.
No more than superficial attention is likely to be given the supposed
standard of full opportunity to litigate because to take it seriously would
be unsatisfactory. It would involve the dissection of the prior trial and
24 N.Y.2d at , 246 N.E.2d at 730.
Id. at , 246 N.E.2d at 732-33 (dissenting opinion)
The experience of the profession is that a passenger in a vehicle who is
injured in a collision should assert his claim against the carriers of both
owners and of both drivers and thus be in a preferred litigation position in
which, barring some odd miscarriage, it is next to impossible to lose.
But 'justice' in the sense that one or the other driver might have some
serious injury and a good claim to be compensated from the proceeds of the
universal coverage suggests that the preferred position of the passenger should
not be permitted to impair a driver's claim. He can assert it as a crossclaim in the passenger's action, but the jury must be told that if the passenger
recovers against both drivers neither can recover against the other and so the
drivers' actions are in practice more subordinated if not submerged in the
passenger's action by the method of litigation.
When the situation is seen whole this is unfair because only those in this
kind of disadvantageous litigation position, and only because of that position,
are frequently denied recovery which people able to assert their own claims
in uncomplicated procedure will have.
60.
61.
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all circumstances surrounding it, inviting the presentation of extensive
evidence which would have bearing on the standard, which itself would
be extremely difficult to define with clarity. As said before, days in court
vary greatly in quality; surely this is an area of infinite shades of
gray. Thus, not only would determination of the issue be expensive and
difficult, but also very doubtful to predict. It seems unquestionable that
stare decisis and certainty are more important in the area of judgment
reliance than in any other area of procedure.62
In the long run the courts which have rejected mutuality may have
lost more than they have gained, both in the expense of litigation and
the reliability of judgments, all to combat an evil which has not been
clearly demonstrated to exist to a burdensome extent.
CONCLUSION

Because of the confidence with which respected judges 3 have rejected mutuality, it has become popular to say that a party should have
only a single opportunity to litigate an issue unless in a special context
there is good reason otherwise. This attitude runs counter to the most
basic principle of modern procedural reform: presumptively, disputes
should be resolved according to as fully an informed judgment as possible
regarding the merits of the parties' positions, and litigation of the merits
should be precluded only for pressing reasons. 4
62. See Spetfigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557, 564 (1968):
Perhaps none of the apprehensions above expressed themselves in the record
before us now and were we inclined to decide this case on the basis of
whether 'justice' will have been accomplished, it would be a close question as to
whether the defendant here should be denied another day in court on the issue
of liability. In his recantation, this is the only limitation Currie would place
upon the Bernhard doctrine-that it not be applied 'to work injustice.' See,
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 25, 37 (1965).
Such an approach is a temptingly simple way to solve all of the cases that
might come before this court. But, in our view, this panacea is the antithesis
of our system of justice, which has been the skeletal structure about which the
world's finest civilization has developed. Concepts of 'justice' vary from man
to man and from time to time and we can conceive of no more pernicious
an evil than for an appellate court to lay down law in high-sounding language
but in such broad terms that its application to the particular case cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty until the highest court in the
particular judicial hierarchy has made its august pronouncement as to what
is 'justice.'
63. Among them are Justice Traynor in Bernhard, Judge Friendly in Zdanok and
Judge Hastie in Bruzewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).
64. See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 71 (1947) :
It is to be hoped that this development [continuing procedural reform]
may have some effect of combating what may be best described as procedural
particularism-the resort to a rule of procedure, often subconsciously created
or inflated for the occasion, as a short cut to doing justice in a particular case.
This is an inveterate tendency of our law, and, indeed, is to be expected to some
extent at least, since procedure must always be subordinated to the achieving of
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The current state of the law can only be described as unsettled. In
recent years a few cases have rejected mutuality outright,"5 while others
have stood by the traditional doctrine.6" In the middle, some cases seem
to say that the mutuality doctrine is so outmoded that it should be applied
only in anomalous cases,67 while others suggest that great care should be
taken that departure from mutuality in particular cases will not produce
injustice.6" Some cases have purported to reject mutuality in cases where
it was not necessary to the result;69 a few have failed to apply the
mutuality restriction to an appropriate case without comment." Many of
the cases in their evaluation of precedent have failed to make any
distinction between holding and dicta.
"Mutuality" has become a bad word in this modern age, and
certainly there are mutuality doctrines of various kinds which have little
to recommend them. In the area of judgments, however, rejection of
mutuality has been based on arguments which are more obvious than
sound. Judgments are a product which litigants purchase with investments
of time and money, for the most part in a rational way with the advice of
counsel. Parties regulate themselves for purposes of economy, and it has
never been demonstrated that the courts and public have a greater interest
in reducing the cost of litigation than do the parties themselves. There is
something tidy and law-and-orderish about asserting that a party is
entitled to only a single adequate opportunity to litigate an issue. But the
law of res judicata exists to protect winners, not to punish losers, and the
justice. Nevertheless, it is believed that the courts should recognize the obligation to be frank with litigants and to rest their decisions, so far as possible,
upon the equities of the case before them, rather than upon some off hand
procedural generalization or abstraction.
65. E.g., Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Desmond v.
Kramer, 96 N.J. Super., 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967) ; and Schwartz v. Public Administrator
24 N.Y.2d 65, 4 N.E.2d 725 (1969).
66. Among the more recent cases are: Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281,
445 P.2d 557 (1968); Mayhew v. Deister, Ind. App.- , 244 N.E.2d 448 (1969);
Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969); Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C.
405, 152 S.E.2d 418 (1967) ; Raz v. Mills, 233 Ore. 452, 378 P.2d 959 (1963) ; and
Farhart v. Blackshear, 434 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
67. E.g., Zdanok v. The Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
68. E.g., Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968). Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pacific Airlines Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
69. E.g., Davis v. McKinnon and Mooney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Bruzewski
v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins.
Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) ; McAndrew v. Mularchuck, 38 N.J. 156, 183 A.2d 74 (19621) ;
and B. R. DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967). Most cases in which
the mutuality requirement is not applied still fall easily within the "related non-common
parties" or the prior criminal conviction exceptions. See notes 11-28 and accompanying
text supra.
70. Ham v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Okla. 1968); Cover v.
Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956).

MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL

19

courts will be well advised to assess the value of the mutuality doctrine
with greater sympathy than they have shown it in recent years. The
mutuality of estoppel requirement, with its traditional exceptions, has
served justice well in the past, and there is no reason why it should not
continue to do so.

